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THE INFLATIONARY IMPACT OF WAGE INDEXATION
Abstract
It is an open question whether and how indexed wage contracts reduce welfare or raise
average inflation. This paper analyzes the impact of indexed wage contracts on inflation and
social welfare in a Barro–Gordon model with discretionary monetary policy by endogenizing
social costs of indexation. Main results are: Wage indexation reduces the inflation bias but
may raise the variance of inflation rates. In social optimum wages are fully indexed to the
price level, but this requires optimal wage adjustments to productivity shocks. If wage
adjustments to productivity are suboptimal, the second best solution calls for non–indexed
wage contracts and a central banker with balanced aspiration levels of employment and real
wages. In case of decentralized wage bargaining, a prohibition of wage indexation may
improve welfare.
JEL Code: E24, E52.








It has often been said that indexed contracts advance inﬂation. On one hand, wage index-
ation increases the slope of the Phillips curve and makes it more diﬃcult to use monetary
policy for stabilizing employment. Indexed bonds prevent that inﬂation depreciates the
real value of government debt and indexed tax schemes decouple real revenues of a pro-
gressive income tax from inﬂation. Thereby, indexation reduces the government’s gains
from inﬂation and its incentive for expansionary monetary policy. On the other hand, in-
dexation reduces social costs of inﬂation and the central bank’s resistance to inﬂationary
policy. These two eﬀects inﬂuence the inﬂation bias in opposite directions, and within
the standard model of monetary policy by Barro and Gordon (1983) it is not clear under
which circumstances one or the other eﬀect dominates (Mourmouras, 1993).
Wage indexation reduces social costs of inﬂation because real wage stability is viewed
at as being socially desirable. This paper extends the Barro–Gordon model by including
costs of real wage ﬂuctuations in the social loss function and endogenizes both, the slope of
the Phillips curve and social costs associated with wage indexation. This allows a rigorous
comparison of both eﬀects and shows that wage indexation unambiguously reduces the
inﬂation bias but may raise or lower the variance of inﬂation rates depending on the
weight that the central bank attaches to the goal of price stability.
Wage indexation to the price level and wage adjustments to productivity are means
to allocate risk stemming from real shocks and monetary policy. From Gray (1976) and
Fischer (1977) we know that indexation tends to stabilize output in the case of nominal
shocks, but prevents the necessary adjustments to real shocks. In Gray’s model, the opti-
mal degree of indexation is an interior solution and corresponds to the relative importance
of nominal shocks. This relies on her assumption that wage contracts cannot be condi-
tioned on productivity measures. As Karni (1983) laid out, indexation schemes are capable
to duplicate the perfect information equilibrium if wages are indexed to a set of variables
that are a suﬃcient statistic for exogenous shocks. In our model, wage contractors aim at
minimizing a weighted average of the variances of employment and real wages. They can
achieve an optimal allocation of supply side risk by indexing wages to some measure of
productivity. Demand shocks can be neutralized by indexation to prices. Full indexation
to the price level makes the real sector immune to monetary policy and eliminates any
incentive, to pursue employment goals by inﬂation. Hence, the central bank concentrates
on stabilizing prices and the inﬂation bias is zero.
In real economies, however, asymmetric information impedes optimal wage adjust-
ments to productivity shocks. Monetary policy can act as a partial substitute for insuf-
ﬁcient wage adjustments by responding to temporary supply shocks and smoothing the
adjustment process of the real economy to permanent shocks. In the paper, it is shown
2that for suboptimal wage adjustments to productivity, monetary policy improves the al-
location of supply side risk at the cost of ﬂuctuating prices. The optimal monetary policy
rule balances costs of price ﬂuctuations with eﬃciency gains from stabilizing the real sec-
tor. A high degree of wage indexation hampers real eﬀects of monetary policy on labor
markets and raises the variance of inﬂation rates that is necessary to re–allocate risk in
the real sector. Hence, wage indexation may reduce welfare, although it always lowers the
inﬂation bias.
Fischer (1983) argued that wage indexation may raise the variance of the price level,
but has no eﬀect on average inﬂation. Barro and Gordon (1983) have shown that reduced
social costs of inﬂation will have a positive eﬀect on the rate of inﬂation in a discretionary
equilibrium. Fischer and Summers (1989) rely on the same argument and conclude that
avoiding inﬂation mitigation measures is one way of committing to low future inﬂation
rates. Governments whose ability to maintain low rates of inﬂation is uncertain should
not reduce the costs of actual inﬂation.
On the other side, Giersch (1973) argued that wage indexation helps to avoid reduc-
tions in employment during the transition from high to low inﬂation rates. Crosby (1995)
pointed out that indexation disables the government to pursue employment goals and thus,
works as a credible commitment to low inﬂation, but it imposes costs in the form of sub-
optimal wage adjustments to real shocks. Devereux (1987, 1989) incorporates endogenous
wage contracts into the Barro–Gordon model and analyzes the relation between average
and variance of inﬂation. Ball (1988) argues that wage indexation is eﬃcient, even in a
decentralized economy. But, in his model monetary policy is assumed to be exogenous.
Adolph and Wolfstetter (1991) detect informational externalities of wage indexation and
show that Ball’s result is not robust. If monetary policy depends to indexation, decen-
tralized unions do not account for the positive external eﬀect that indexation has on the
inﬂation bias and the overall degree of indexation may be too low (Waller and VanHoose,
1992). However, this approach does not consider welfare improvements of state contin-
gent monetary policy. If monetary policy responds to supply shocks, indexation creates a
negative externality which may reverse the result as we show in this paper.
Ball and Cecchetti (1991) assume a social loss function that depends on real wages
only. This accounts for the social costs of inﬂation that are reduced by wage indexation.
Consequently, inﬂation and welfare increase with the proportion of indexed wage con-
tracts. Duca and VanHoose (2001) assume that wage contracting results from minimizing
a weighted average of ﬂuctuations in real wages and employment. They show that greater
sectoral output variance reduces the use of nominal wage contracts. Calmfors and Johans-
son (2002) rely on a similar argument and show that entry in a monetary union implies
stronger incentives to use indexed wage contracts.
The next section presents an extended Barro–Gordon model that explicitly considers
social costs of wage ﬂuctuations and shows how discretionary monetary policy depends
3on the degree of wage indexation and on wage adjustments with respect to supply shocks.
Optimal indexation is analyzed in Section 3. Here, we distinguish between a reference
solution with optimal wage ﬂexibility and a second best solution that applies if wage
adjustments to productivity are not optimal. Section 4 deals with decentralized economies
in which wage setters choose wage contracts in order to minimize a weighted average of
ﬂuctuations in employment and real wages. We show how this choice is inﬂuenced by a
possible interdiction of wage indexation and proof that a ban on wage indexation to the
price level is welfare improving, provided that the inﬂation bias can be controlled by other
means. Section 5 discusses robustness of results with respect to demand shocks. Section
6 concludes this paper.
2 Discretionary Monetary Policy in the Presence of Wage
Indexation
In the next two sections we describe the interaction between wage setters and a central
bank. Wage contracts allow for indexation of nominal wages to the actual price level
and for ﬂexible adjustments to supply shocks. The central bank controls the price level
in order to minimize a weighted average of ﬂuctuations in employment, prices and real
wages around socially desired levels that may deviate from equilibrium levels. The time
structure of our model is as follows:
1. Wage setters agree upon a wage contract that speciﬁes the nominal wage as a
function of unexpected changes in the aggregate price level and of supply conditions.
2. A supply shock µ realizes.
3. Monetary authority sets money supply.
4. Firms decide on employment and production. Equilibrium prices are formed simul-
taneously. Wages are adjusted according to the agreed–upon contract.
The basic variables of our model are nominal wages w, price level p, employment l
and output y. Small letters always denote logarithmic terms and may be interpreted as
growth rates.
The production function is given by
y = al + µ; 0 < a < 1; (1)
4where µ is a random productivity shock, distributed with variance ¾2
µ > 0 around a mean
of zero. Firms decide on labor demand and output by maximizing their proﬁts. Hence,
labor demand is given by
l = lnargmax
L
fP Y ¡ W L j Y = ΘLag; (2)
where capital letters denote the according non–logarithmic terms. Firms produce a ho-
mogeneous good and stand in perfect competition. Maximizing proﬁts yields the labor
demand function
l ¡ ¯ l =
1
1 ¡ a
[p ¡ w + µ]; (3)
where ¯ l = lna=(1 ¡ a) is expected employment.
Short run labor supply is assumed to be high enough to meet whatever is demanded,
so there is no rationing of ﬁrms even in the case of positive shocks. We shall calculate
the expected values under this hypothesis. Consistency requires that the support of our
random term is limited above, because otherwise short–run labor supply would have to be
inﬁnite.
A wage contract is supposed to be a function
w = pe + (1 ¡ ¸)(p ¡ pe) + Áµ: (4)
pe is the expected price level, 1 ¡ ¸ is the degree of wage indexation to aggregate prices,
and Á is an index for wage adjustments to productivity. From equations (3) and (4) we
get the short–run Phillips curve
l ¡ ¯ l =
1
1 ¡ a
[¸(p ¡ pe) + (1 ¡ Á)µ]: (5)
A high degree of wage indexation (¸ close to 0) leads to a steep Phillips curve and a high
sacriﬁce ratio. With a low index of wage adjustments to productivity, the Phillips curve
is shifted by supply shocks, i.e. supply shocks have a large impact on employment.
A similar relation obtains for real wages,
w ¡ p = ¸(pe ¡ p) + Áµ: (6)
Equation (6) shows that ¸ is the elasticity of real wages with respect to unexpected
inﬂation. It can be interpreted as the degree to which wages stay behind the price level if
5that exceeds its expected value. Á is the real wage elasticity w.r.t. productivity. It may be
viewed at as the speed of wage adjustments to supply shocks. It may also be interpreted
as a productivity bonus.1
Aggregate demand is generated by the quantity equation, and prices are assumed to
clear the goods market. This deﬁnes the price level as
p = m ¡ y; (7)
Using (5), the aggregate production function (1) and quantity equation (7) imply
p ¡ pe =
1
1 + c¸
[m ¡ ¯ y ¡ pe ¡ (1 + c(1 ¡ Á))µ]; (8)
where ¯ y = a¯ l and c = a=(1 ¡ a).
The social loss function is extended by including real wages as an explicit policy goal.
It is deﬁned by
C = (l ¡ l¤)2 + ¯ (p ¡ p¤)2 + ° (w ¡ p ¡ w¤)2; (9)
where l¤, p¤ and w¤ are desired levels of employment, prices and real wages, ¯ 2 [0;1] is
the relative weight on the goal of price stability, and ° 2 [0;1] is the relative weight on the
real wage goal. The explicit consideration of real wages in the loss function endogenizes
social costs of wage indexation as in Ball and Cecchetti (1991). This term measures
the costs that are associated with deviations of real wages from their intended level2.
Wage indexation reduces real wage ﬂuctuations and associated social costs via this term.
Henceforth, costs of price ﬂuctuations, ¯, do not depend on wage indexation.
We assume that monetary authorities set money supply m in order to minimize the
social loss as deﬁned above.
m = argmin
m C: (10)
Monetary policy determines the inﬂation bias and how prices depend on supply shocks.
1Alternatively, one could replace wage adjustments to productivity by adjustments to ﬁrm revenues,
unemployment or any other variable that depends on productivity, but is not perfectly correlated with
prices. Karni (1983) has demonstrated that optimal wage indexation to aggregate prices and output can
duplicate the equilibrium that would obtain if wages could be conditioned on the shocks directly. A wage
contract that restricts wage adjustments to prices and supply shocks is an analytical simpliﬁcation.
2Ball and Cecchetti (1991) assumed a social loss function that depends on real wages only.
6Proposition 1 Discretionary monetary policy in a rational expectations equilibrium is
described by the price rule p = pe ¡ q µ with
pe = p¤ +
¸
b
(ck ¡ g w¤) (11)
and
q = ¸
c2 ¡ Á(c2 + g)
¸2 (c2 + g) + b
: (12)
Proof Solving the central bank’s optimization problem (10) with respect to (5), (6)
and (8) yields the ﬁrst order condition @C
@(p¡pe)
@(p¡pe)




Hence, monetary policy is characterized by @C
@(p¡pe) = 0, which is equivalent to
[¸2(c2 + g) + b](p ¡ pe) + ¸[c2 ¡ Á(c2 + g)]µ = ¸ck ¡ b(pe ¡ p¤) ¡ ¸gw¤; (13)
where k = a(l¤ ¡ ¯ l), b = a2 ¯, and g = a2 °. With rational expectations, pe equals the
unconditional expectation of p at stage 1 one of the game, E(p). Applying this to (13)
yields the price rule in Proposition 1. QED
The expected price level pe (or rather the rate of inﬂation, since we have logarithmic
terms) deviates from the socially desired one if and only if ck 6= g w¤. As we know from
standard versions of the Barro–Gordon model, it is higher, the larger the gap k between
desired and equilibrium output and the ﬂatter the Phillips curve (larger c). The real wage
goal has an opposite eﬀect. The higher desired real wages w¤, the lower is inﬂation. With
balanced aspiration levels of employment and real wages, the inﬂation bias is zero for any
degree of wage indexation.
Equation (11) shows that the deviation between expected and desired price level is
zero for full indexation (¸ = 0) and rises with falling degree of wage indexation (rising
¸). A high degree of indexation reduces the capability of monetary policy to inﬂuence
employment and real wages. It makes the real sector immune to monetary policy. Hence,
there is a low incentive to use monetary policy for achieving real eﬀects. The public
correctly expects the central bank to concentrate on stabilizing prices and the inﬂation
bias is close to zero in this case.
q is a monetary stabilization term that may have either sign, depending on whether
social costs are dominated by employment or real wage ﬂuctuations. (5) and (6) show that
wage adjustments to productivity Á shift uncertainty from employment to real wages.
If ﬂexibility is low, employment ﬂuctuations are a more serious threat to welfare than
ﬂuctuating wages. In this case the goal of employment stability dominates real wage
stability, q is positive, and prices move in opposite direction to aggregate supply shocks.
7A drop in productivity will be accompanied by a rise in prices. This dampens the shock’s
impact on employment and leads to stronger volatility in real wages. On the other hand, if
the central bank thinks that wages overreact to supply shocks, it could reverse the process
by creating a positive correlation between productivity and prices.
Monetary policy can substitute wage adjustments to productivity in its task to allocate
uncertainty between employment and real wages. However, if monetary policy is used for
an active re–allocation of uncertainty between real variables, this leads to undesirable price
ﬂuctuations. Proposition 1 implies Var(p) = q2 ¾2
µ. As (12) shows, this variance is smaller,
the bigger social costs of price ﬂuctuations b are. If b is very high, or if real eﬀects of
prices are low (e.g. for ¸ close to zero), the central bank will hardly use monetary policy
to achieve real eﬀects.
It has been suspected that indexation raises the inﬂationary impact of negative supply
shocks3. Obviously, this cannot be true in general. In the case of full wage indexation
(¸ = 0) real variables are immune to monetary policy, and the central bank will concentrate
on stabilizing prices, i.e. q equals zero. Using (12), we ﬁnd that @q2=@¸ < 0 if and only
if ¸2 > b
c2+g. This shows that the variance of p rises in the degree of wage indexation
(1 ¡ ¸) if and only if ¸2 > b
c2+g.
b
c2+g is the relation between social costs of price ﬂuctuations and the costs of real
ﬂuctuations. If b < c2 + g, low degrees of indexation raise price instability until a level
is reached where rising marginal costs of price instability outweigh decreasing marginal
beneﬁts from stability of real variables. A further increase in indexation is a disincentive
for the central bank to use monetary policy to achieve real eﬀects and, therefore, lowers
price volatility until its elimination with full indexation. If b > c2 +g, an increase in wage
indexation always lowers the variance of the price level.
3 Optimal Indexation
The impact of supply shocks must be borne by real variables. This can best be seen from
(1 ¡ a)(l ¡ ¯ l) + (w ¡ p) ´ µ; (14)
which is implied by Equations (5) and (6). The distribution of a shock’s impact on employ-
ment and real wages is optimal if it accords with the weights in the social cost function.
This distribution can be perfectly controlled by wage adjustments to productivity, sum-
marized by the index Á. If wages adjust in an optimal way, there is no need for monetary
3Theoretical analysis by Fischer (1983) suggests that indexation raises the inﬂationary impact of neg-
ative supply shocks, his empirical analysis does not support this view.
8policy to re–shift ﬂuctuations between real variables. Instead, monetary policy can con-
centrate on stabilizing prices. Full indexation eliminates the inﬂation bias, because it
works like a credible commitment of the central bank, not to pursue an output or a real
wage goal.
Proposition 2 The elasticities of real wages w.r.t. prices and productivity that minimize
expected social costs are given by ¸¤ = 0 and Á¤ = c2
c2+g, leading to pe = 0 and q = 0.
Proof see Appendix.
It accords with basic intuition that optimal wage adjustments to productivity are
higher, for a lower relative weight on real wage stability in the social cost function. Setting
g = 0 gives the special case that has been well analyzed by much of the older literature.
In this case the optimal degree of wage adjustments is one, preventing any employment
ﬂuctuations, as in Karni (1983). But, even for a positive weight on real wage stability,
with optinmal wage adjustments to productivity, full indexation minimizes social costs, as
in Ball and Cecchetti (1991).4
In real economies, however, asymmetric information and moral hazard impede an
optimal and immediate adjustment of wages to measures of productivity. In addition,
legal and procedural conﬁnements may restrict ﬂexibility of labor markets, as is often
claimed especially with respect to European labor markets. Theoretical papers often
neglect contingent contracts and implicitly set Á = 0, which is an extreme limitation to
wage ﬂexibility as it does not allow for any direct wage adjustments to productivity shocks.
If wage adjustments are not optimal, there are two opposing welfare eﬀects: A high
degree of indexation lowers the inﬂation bias and reduces social costs of inﬂation, but it
also disables monetary policy to stabilize real variables in substitution for insuﬃcient wage
adjustments, and thus increases social costs of real ﬂuctuations.
If the index of wage adjustments to productivity is stuck below Á¤, employment ﬂuc-
tuates too much in comparison to real wages. The central bank can make up for this by
letting prices move in opposite direction of shocks, i.e. q > 0. But, this requires imperfect
indexation, since otherwise monetary policy is ineﬀective. In order to reach a given allo-
cation of uncertainty between real variables, price deviations can be smaller, the lower the
degree of indexation is. So, with suboptimal wage adjustments, a low degree of indexation
to prices may be advantageous, because it allows to stabilize employment at low costs of
price uncertainty.
4In their model optimal wage adjustments to productivity are zero, because their loss function consists
of real wage ﬂuctuations only.
9Proposition 3 If the degree of wage adjustments to productivity is not optimal (Á 6= Á¤)
and ck = g w¤, expected social costs E(C) rise in the degree of wage indexation to prices
(1 ¡ ¸).
Proof see Appendix.
If the desired levels of employment and real wages are such that ck = g w¤, the
inﬂation bias is zero independent of the degree of wage indexation. If, in addition, wage
adjustments to productivity are suboptimal, expected social costs unambiguously rise
with rising degree of indexation. Reason is the hampering eﬀect of indexation on the
eﬀectiveness of monetary policy in its eﬀort to compensate the lack of wage adjustments.
Here, the optimal degree of wage indexation is zero.
Following Rogoﬀ (1985) and Walsh (1995) it should be possible to design central bank
contracts in such a way that monetary policy aims at minimizing costs of ﬂuctuations
without caring for the absolute levels of employment and real wages or to choose a central
banker whose preferences fulﬁll ck = g w¤. In these cases there is no inﬂation bias to fear,
indexation is irrelevant if wage adjustments to productivity are optimal, and if they are
suboptimal we should abstain from wage indexation to prices. This describes a second
best solution, and it is remarkable that the second best degree of indexation is zero instead
of one in the optimum.
4 Endogenous Wage Contracts in a Decentralized Economy
So far, we have compared social costs and beneﬁts of wage indexation for a given degree
of wage adjustments to productivity. But, wage contracts are not exogenous. Following
Devereux (1987, 1989), Ball (1988), and Waller and VanHoose (1992) we incorporate wage
setters’ decisions on contract parameters ¸ and Á.
There is a continuum of ﬁrms i 2 [0;1] with production functions
yi = ali + µi; 0 < a < 1; (15)
where µi = µ + ±i. ±i is the deviation of sector i’s productivity from the aggregate.
Without loss of generality we may assume that
R
i ±i di ´ 0. We assume that random
terms µ and ±i are pairwise independent of each other. The variance of ±i is denoted by
¾2




Labor demand in sector i is given by
li ¡ ¯ l =
1
1 ¡ a
[p ¡ wi + µi]: (16)
10A wage contract in sector i is a function
wi = pe + (1 ¡ ¸i)(p ¡ pe) + Ái µi: (17)
At stage 1 of the game, wage setters specify contract parameters ¸i and Ái in order to
minimize a weighted average of expected ﬂuctuations in employment and real wages.
(¸i;Ái) = arg min
¸i;Ái
Var(li) + ³ Var(wi ¡ p): (18)
³ 2 [0;1] represents the relative weight given to the goal of stabilizing real wages5.
The solution to this optimization problem depends on price ﬂuctuations which are
controlled by the central bank. When deciding on contract parameters, wage setters take
the central bank’s response to supply shocks into account. Therefore, we distinguish
between cases where private contractors’ weight on real wage stability ³ equals, exceeds
or falls short of the public weight °. For simplicity we assume that ¾i is the same for all
sectors and conﬁne ourselves to symmetric equilibria, where discretionary monetary policy
is as described by Proposition (1).
Proposition 4 In an unconstrained symmetric equilibrium, wage adjustments to produc-
tivity are given by ˆ Á = 1=z, with z = 1+³ (1¡a)2. If ³ 6= °, wage contractors choose full
wage indexation to prices, ¸ = 0.
Proof see Appendix.
ˆ Á is the unique equilibrium degree of wage adjustments when wage indexation is not
constrained. It is an interior optimum for the wage reaction to supply shocks. Higher
reactions to supply shocks would hurt desired real wage stability, lower reactions would
lead to too strong ﬂuctuations in employment. With direct reactions of wages to supply
shocks, the remaining purpose of indexation is to eliminate shocks from unanticipated price
movements that may be due to spillover eﬀects from other sectors or from monetary policy.
Given monetary policy as speciﬁed above, in symmetric equilibria such price movements
occur whenever Á 6= Á¤.
Let us ﬁrst have a look on the special case where ³ = °. This condition says that private
and social weight on real wage stability are the same. Here, contracted wage adjustments ˆ Á
equal Á¤. They are regarded as appropriate by the central bank and duplicate the perfect
information equilibrium. The distribution of a shock’s impact between ﬂuctuations of
employment and real wages is optimal and the central bank has no reason to use monetary
5Cukierman and Lippi (1999) and Lawler (2001) argue that price stability should also be included in
the unions objective function. We assume instead that sectors are too small to inﬂuence aggregate prices.
11policy to redistribute uncertainty. Monetary policy concentrates on stabilizing prices and
eliminates all ﬂuctuations here. Hence, indexation serves no purpose and the degree of
indexation is irrelevant.
Although monetary policy could achieve the same ﬂuctuations of aggregate employ-
ment and real wages as optimal wage adjustments, private contracts achieve this goal
better, because they account for sectoral productivity changes while monetary policy can
only respond to aggregates. Besides, if monetary policy is used to re–allocate uncertainty
between employment and real wages, it also leads to ﬂuctuating prices. This creates a
welfare loss that can be avoided if the shock’s impact is properly allocated by wage con-
tracts.
If the private weight for real wage stability exceeds the social weight (³ > °), then
the central bank views wage adjustments to productivity as too low6 and is interested
in shifting a part of the shock’s impact from labor to real wages by creating a negative
correlation between supply shocks and price level. For ³ < ° these eﬀects are reversed.7
However, such policies can only succeed if ¸ > 0. Full indexation (¸ = 0) eliminates all
possibilities to achieve real eﬀects by monetary policy.
Let us now describe the constrained equilibrium for limited indexation. If indexation
is prohibited, the individually optimal degree of wage adjustments to productivity solves
(18) with respect to ¸ = 1. The solution to this problem deviates from the unconstrained
optimum, if wage contractors and monetary authority put diﬀerent weights on the goal of
real wage stability.
Lemma 1 If wage contracts cannot be indexed to the price level, in a symmetric equilib-
rium wage adjustments are given by
Á = ˆ Á
·
1 ¡
a2 (³ ¡ °)






If ³ > °, the private weight on real wage stability exceeds the social weight attributed
to this goal. Wage setters stipulate suboptimal wage adjustments to productivity and the
central bank has an incentive to shift uncertainty from labor to real wages by creating a
negative correlation between supply shocks and prices. Wage setters would want to oﬀset
the eﬀects of monetary policy by indexing to the price level. But, if wage indexation is
restricted, wage negotiators will arrange even lower wage adjustments and, thus, steer
against monetary policy. Thus, limits to wage indexation reduce wage adjustments to
6Suboptimal wage ﬂexibility may also arise, if wage adjustments to productivity are costly, with asym-
metric information on productivity measures or when moral hazard is involved.
7This case seems less relevant to real economies.
12productivity. This might describe the situation in some European and Latin American
countries, where wage indexation is forbidden or socially banned. So, we have two opposing
eﬀects on welfare: Limiting the degree of indexation makes monetary policy more eﬀective
in stabilizing employment and thus, increases welfare. But, the entailed reduction in wage
adjustments destabilizes employment and reduces welfare.
If ³ < °, wage negotiators pay too little attention to real wage stability.8 If indexation
is prohibited, Á exceeds ˆ Á. Here, the interdiction of indexed contracts increases wage
adjustments to productivity, but again, this is not in the interest of social welfare, because
the degree of adjustments exceeds the social optimum already (ˆ Á > Á¤). So, we also have
opposing welfare eﬀects of limits to indexation. The next proposition states that the net
eﬀect is unique, and for ck = g w¤ social costs always lower, when indexation to the price
level is restricted.
Proposition 5 Assume that ³ 6= ° and ck = g w¤. If the degree of wage indexation wage
indexation can be limited above by (1 ¡ ¯ ¸), expected social costs E(C) rise in 1 ¡ ¯ ¸.
Proof see Appendix.
If ck = g w¤, the net welfare eﬀect of indexation is unambiguously negative. Hence, a
prohibition of indexation (¯ ¸ = 1) is the second best solution, even with endogenous wage
contracting.
Proposition 5 shows that there may be good reasons to interdict wage indexation
although it may be desired by wage negotiators. Reason is a conﬂict in interests between
contracting parties (insiders) on one hand and those who are excluded from negotiations
(unemployed, outsiders) on the other hand. Without wage indexation, the central bank can
correct the distribution of uncertainty that insiders impose on outsiders. The strength of
this result comes from the fact that avoiding wage indexation is optimal whenever private
and social weights for real wage stability do not coincide. There is no need to argue which
one is larger. It is suﬃcient that two distinct groups of society have diﬀerent preferences.
Proposition 5 is in sharp contrast to Waller and VanHoose (1992), who emphasized
the positive external eﬀect of wage indexation on the inﬂation bias. Assuming ck = g w¤,
the inﬂation bias is zero. Our result demonstrates that wage indexation has a negative
external eﬀect on stabilizing the economy by state contingent monetary policy.
An interdiction of wage indexation improves welfare if and only if it is possible to keep
the inﬂation bias low by other means, e.g. by appointing a central banker whose aspiration
8This seems a rather odd assumption, because the social welfare function should also regard the interest
of the unemployed who have no advantage from real wage stability. But, note that in some countries social
beneﬁts to unemployed or retired people are coupled to wages. So, retired people may be interested in
real wage stability while being indiﬀerent to employment ﬁgures. Since retired people are an important
fraction of all voters, their aims might be over–represented in the government’s objective function and spill
over to central bank objectives.
13levels for employment and real wages are such that ck¡g w¤ is close to zero. If this is not
possible, the inﬂation bias is high without wage indexation, and indexed wage contracts
reduce the inﬂation bias so much that these gains outweigh the losses that are associated
with induced stronger volatility in real variables. Thus, indexed wage contracts should be
permitted in countries that cannot control the inﬂation bias otherwise.
Summarizing, we can say that wage indexation lowers welfare if wage reactions to
productivity are suboptimal and if the inﬂation bias can be controlled without indexed
wage contracts.
5 Demand Shocks
So far, demand shocks were not considered. It is well known from Gray (1976) and Fischer
(1977) that indexation is socially desirable if demand shocks are the prevailing sort of
uncertainty. In this chapter, we extend the previous model by including monetary shocks
that cannot be observed by the central bank9. This adds a third condition for a negative
welfare eﬀect of wage indexation: wage indexation lowers welfare if wages reactions to
productivity are suboptimal, if the inﬂation bias can be controlled without indexed wage
contracts, and if demand shocks are suﬃciently small.
Monetary shocks alter the demand equation (7) that is replaced by
p = m ¡ y + v; (20)
where v is a random shock, uncorrelated to productivity shocks µ and ±i. Since v is not
observable by the central bank, price movements are given by




where pe and q are as deﬁned in Proposition 1.
Unconditional expected social loss with demand uncertainty is
EC = ECjv´0 +
(c2 + g)¸2 + b
(1 + c¸)2 ¾2
v: (22)
Optimal wage adjustments to productivity are not altered by introducing demand
shocks. Demand shocks make an even more stringent case for wage indexation, as it
9Any demand shock that is observable by the central bank will be neutralized and has no eﬀect on the
real economy.
14not only eliminates the inﬂation bias, but also prevents from demand shocks having real
eﬀects.
However, if wages adjust to productivity in a suboptimal way, we have three eﬀects:
As laid out above, monetary policy can work as a partial substitute for insuﬃcient wage
adjustments if wages are not indexed to the price level. This calls for a low degree of
wage indexation. On the other hand, inﬂation bias and demand shocks are reasons why
indexation might improve welfare. The negative welfare eﬀect of indexation is prevailing
if aspiration levels of the central bank, regarding employment and real wage goal, are
balanced and demand shocks are suﬃciently small.












(c2 + g)¸ + cb
(1 + c¸)3 ¾2
v: (23)
The ﬁrst term has been shown to be negative in Propositions 3 and 5. The second term
is positive. If money demand is stable and highly predictable, ¾2
v is small, expected social
costs are decreasing in ¸, and non–indexed wage contracts are optimal. Otherwise, ¾2
v is
large and indexation has positive welfare eﬀects by insulating the economy from demand
shocks that are more important than compensation of insuﬃcient wage adjustments by
monetary policy.
6 Conclusion
Within the Barro–Gordon model the literature recognized two opposing eﬀects of indexed
wage contracts on inﬂation: a steeper Phillips curve reduces incentives to use inﬂation-
ary policy, but lower costs of inﬂation reduce the resistance to inﬂation. The net eﬀect
appeared to be ambiguous. This paper provides a uniﬁed framework for studying both
eﬀects. Endogenizing social costs of real wage ﬂuctuations, the paper has shown that
indexed wage contracts do always reduce the inﬂation bias.
Welfare eﬀects of indexation are ambiguous, though. While lowering the inﬂation bias
improves welfare, indexed wage contracts reduce the ability of state contingent monetary
policy to stabilize the real sector. This reduces welfare. Therefore, policy recommenda-
tions must consider the speciﬁc situation of a country. If wages respond with suﬃcient
ﬂexibility to changes in productivity, full indexation is socially optimal, because it reduces
the inﬂation bias and insulates the real economy from demand shocks. In this case, there
is no need to stabilize the real sector by monetary policy, which voids the negative welfare
eﬀect of indexed wage contracts.
15Suﬃcient wage adjustments to productivity plus full wage indexation are always a
ﬁrst best solution. However, conﬂicting interests between wage setters and other parts
of society and costs of implementing state contingent wage contracts are two important
reasons, why wage adjustments to productivity may fall short of the social optimum. If
wage adjustments to productivity are suboptimal, while the average rate of inﬂation can
be kept low without indexed wage contracts and money demand is highly predictable,
then the negative welfare eﬀects of indexation dominate and wage indexation should be
avoided.
Decentralized wage bargaining creates external eﬀects of indexation: A positive eﬀect
on the inﬂation bias had been recognized by Waller and VanHoose (1992) before. In this
paper, we have shown that wage indexation generates a negative externality on the ability
to stabilize the real economy with monetary policy. Again, policy recommendations are
case sensitive: If the inﬂation bias can be kept at low levels without indexation, a ban on
wage indexation improves welfare.
The strongest opposition against the Barro–Gordon model comes from central bankers,
who deny that central banks aim at achieving employment above expected levels. If central
banks are only concerned with stabilizing prices and real ﬂuctuations, the inﬂation bias
is zero independent of wage indexation. The denial of employment goals has never been
convincing, but including real wages in the loss function, as we did in this paper, adds to
the plausibility of this argument: The majority of voters is interested in high employment
and high wages. Both goals may spill over to monetary policy. But, desires to raise
employment and real wages above their expected levels aﬀect the inﬂation bias in opposing
directions and may oﬀset each other.
We can not and did not intend to answer the question whether central banks should
care about real variables at all. But, to the extent that monetary policy has implications
for employment and real wages, it can be used as a means for macroeconomic stability.
With balanced aspiration levels of employment and real wages, there is no inﬂation bias
to fear, and hence, no case against such macroeconomic stabilization within the logic of
a Barro–Gordon model. Resulting price ﬂuctuations are weighted against the beneﬁcial
stability of other variables. In order to minimize price ﬂuctuations that are associated
with an active monetary policy, wage contracts should not be indexed.
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As q is the optimal stabilization term chosen by the central bank to optimize the


























Proof of Proposition 2 Using (12), @EC=@Á = 0 is equivalent to Á = c2
c2+g. Then
q = 0, and @EC=@¸ = 0 is equivalent to ¸ = 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 3 If ck = g w¤ and the degree of ﬂexibility Á 6= Á¤ is exogenous,











For Á < Á¤ [Á > Á¤], q is positive [negative] and
@EC
@¸
< 0 , ¸(c2 + g)q < [>]c2 ¡ Á(c2 + g)
, ¸2(c2 + g)
c2 ¡ Á(c2 + g)
¸2 (c2 + g) + b
< [>]c2 ¡ Á(c2 + g)
, 0 < [>](c2 ¡ Á(c2 + g))b , 0 < b:
QED
17Proof of Proposition 4 In a symmetric equilibrium
R
i Ái ±i di = 0. Using (16), (17)
and (18), the individually optimal real wage elasticities solve min¸i;Ái f(¸i;Ái), where
f(¸i;Ái) = ¸2
i z Var(p) + 2¸i (1 ¡ z Ái)Cov(p;µi) + (z Ái ¡ 2)Ái Var(µi) (24)
and z = 1 + ³(1 ¡ a)2. The ﬁrst order conditions are
@f
@¸





























i > 0, they imply Ái = 1=z for all i. Note that q = 0 , Á = Á¤ and
Á¤ = 1=z , ° = ³. Hence, for ° = ³ the degree of indexation is indetermined. If ° 6= ³,
the only solution to the FOC’s implies ¸i = 0 for all i. QED
Proof of Lemma 1 If ¸ = 1, Á is determined by equation (25). Using (12) and
solving for Á yields equation (19). QED









If ³ 6= ° and wage indexazion is limited by (1¡ ¯ ¸) < 1, wage contractors will nevertheless
choose Ái according to (25). Using this, @f=@¸ > 0, and wage contractors choose ¸i = ¯ ¸.
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